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STRUGGLING AGAINST THE TIDE: UNITED STATES
PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS TO CURTAIL THE ILLICIT
FLOW OF CULTURAL PROPERTIES
I. INMODUCTION
Cultural property, whether classified as architecture, sculpture,
painting or artifact, has been regarded as something particularly wor-
thy of special study and protection.' Aside from its often extraordinary
aesthetic value, such property is also of importance for its unique his-
torical function.' Cultural property serves as a tangible record of the
development of civilizations and of man in general; its preservation is
imperative if future generations are to observe the accomplishments of
the past as well as those more contemporaneous in nature.3
It is an unfortunate reality that certain nations are essentially de-
void of culturally valuable objects while others are virtually natural de-
positories.4 An illicit international market and traffic in such goods has
developed in response to this situation. As this development has a se-
1. UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, done November 4,
1970, UNESCO Res. 3.344, 16 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res., UNESCO Doc. 15C/Resolu-
tions at art. 1 (1970), reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter cited as UNESCO
Convention with the page numbers of subsequent citations referring to I.L.M.].
2. S. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CUL-
TURAL PROPERTY 52-57 (1978). The historical function refers to cultural property's role in
the explanation and understanding of prior civilizations and cultures. Id. See Note, The
Legal Response to the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
932, 936 (1973). It is stated there that cultural property also has what might be described
as an educative function; the study and observation of foreign art serves to broaden per-
spectives and reduce parochialism. Id.
3. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 52. Man's accomplishments and achievements, as re-
corded in the form of cultural property, may in this regard be viewed as assuming a
universal character; the identification and enchantment with such property cannot be
said to belong exclusively to any one nation. Notwithstanding this universal character,
however, the fact remains that cultural property is found within the borders of sovereign
nations which exercise exclusive jurisdiction therein. Frequently, these states, laden with
culturally significant objects, have enacted legislation rendering their removal illegal.
E.g., Federal Law on Archaeological Artistic and Historic Monuments, 312 DIAmo
OFCiAL [D.O.] 16, May 6, 1972, cited in U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000 (5th Cir.
1977) (absolutely forbidding the exportation of pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico).
For a useful reference material listing the various national legislations relating to the
protection of cultural property, see B. BURNHAM, HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS:
THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY (1975).
4. Merryman, The Protection of Artistic National Patrimony Against Pillaging and
Theft, in ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 230, 233 (L. Duboff ed. 1975); Wn.-
LIAMS, supra note 2, at 56; Note, supra note 2, at 934.
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vere negative impact on the overall status of cultural items,5 legal mea-
sures have been sought in an effort to control what has become a sig-
nificant threat to the continued existence of cultural properties.6
This note will examine the major legal responses that have
emerged to deal with this problem. Particular emphasis will be placed
on the policies being formulated by the United States in its participa-
tion in these legal measures, as that nation represents a major destina-
tion point of the illicit traffic.'
II. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR LEGAL RESPONSES
A. Background
At the heart of the problem of the illicit traffic in cultural proper-
ties lies a fundamental conflict of interests between art-rich nations,
5. The effects of this traffic have been referred to as the "murder of man's history."
Nafziger, Controlling the Northward Flow of Mexican Antiquities, 7 LAW. AM. 68
(1971). Contributing to the problem faced by Mexico is the fact that widespread inflation
in the international art market has led to a change in emphasis from European art ob-
jects to the less familiar pre-Columbian artifacts found throughout the Latin and Central
American countries. Id. It should be noted that as private collectors have acquired more
and more illicitly removed artifacts, their market value has increased tremendously.
Note, supra note 2, at 934. While countries like Mexico have suffered the outrage of
unauthorized removal of their artifacts, the practice has also resulted in the destruction
and desecration of many objects in the process of extraction from their natural sites and
subsequent transportation abroad. Nafziger, supra, at 69; Note, supra note 2, at 936-37,
n.20. See also Rogers & Cohen, Art Pillage-International Solutions, in ART LAW, Do-
MaSTIC AND INTMrNATIONAL 230, 315 (L. Duboff ed. 1975). One of these artifacts is known
as stela, which is notable for its ornamental and sculptural face. This portion is valued
and desired in the marketplace. In order to remove the face, various means are adopted
including the use of crowbars, chisels and acid, frequently causing the ruin of the entire
piece. Nafziger, supra, at 69. It should be further noted that this practice is often the
result of well-conceived and financed operations, employing armed natives and trans-
porting the artifacts by land, sea and air. Id. at 70.
6. E.g., UNESCO Convention, supra note 1.
7. Note, The Retention and Retrieval of Art and Antiquities Through International
and National Means: The Tug of War Over Cultural Property, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
103, 113 (1979). While the focus of the instant discussion is upon the major legal mea-
sures to which the United States is a party, it should be noted that other nations have
been active in this area as well. Id. For example, it has been reported that European
efforts have produced two regional conventions aimed at the protection of cultural prop-
erty, while Asian activity has been fairly limited to the national level. Id. at 117. See
generally BuRNHAM, supra note 3. For a comprehensive survey and discussion of both
national and international action in this regard, see Wu.L"Ms, supra note 2. This book is
of particular interest for its additional analysis of existing measures designed to protect
cultural property in the event of war, a significant threat to cultural property's existence
wholly apart from the destructive consequences of the illicit traffic in such items which is
the subject of the instant discussion.
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seeking desperately to retain their national treasures, and those per-
sons and institutions residing in importing countries, such as the
United States, who desire the unrestricted movement of art.8 Disputes
have continually arisen between these opposing positions with the re-
sult that the decisionmakers in importing countries are repeatedly
pressed to effectuate their resolution. Indeed, increased global interde-
pendence forces the recognition that it is hardly in the best interests of
the United States to alienate art-rich nations by wholly ignoring their
efforts to eliminate the exportation of certain cultural property. On the
other hand, those persons and institutions in the United States advo-
cating the free movement of art are presumably not without political
influence;9 their position also requires attention and consideration.
Thus, the United States must, through formulation of its foreign pol-
icy, seek an accomodation of these positions.
Historically, the United States has been accused of encouraging
the illicit movement of cultural property.10 The source of this allega-
tion is two-fold. First, certain laws have created an incentive to bring
8. From a broad viewpoint, the situation may be analyzed as an elementary example
of the law of supply and demand: given the scarcity of the demanded resource (cultural
property) and a limited supply due to the existing export controls imposed by art-rich
countries, a large unsatisfied demand exists thereby nurturing a lucrative black market.
Dealing more substantively with the conflict, five specific interests have been identi-
fied which essentially argue against free mobility. Merryman, supra note 4, at 233-38.
See also Bator, Regulation and Deregulation of International Trade, in ART LAW, Do-
MESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 230, 302-04 (L. Duboff ed. 1975); Note, supra note 2, at 935-
38. These include: (1) "specific cultural value," the cultural identification and special
significance that often attach to a particular item within a specific community;, (2) "the
archaeological interest," involving the idea of context; the significance of certain artifacts
lies in their particular location where they assist in presenting a composite picture of
how a certain civilization was organized and why; (3) "the integrity of the work of art,"
which refers to the concept that, aesthetically, "the whole of the work of art is greater
than the sum of its parts"; (4) "the safety of the work of art," indicating that irreparable
harm may befall a given object should it travel internationally. Merryman, supra, at 233-
36. (5) "Cultural imperialism," which refers to the notion held by certain art-importing
nations that they are particularly well-suited as a depository of the world's artistic
treasures, regardless of the circumstances of their procurement Nafziger, supra note 5,
at 71; Merryman, supra, at 236-37. As economic considerations have come to play a pre-
dominant role in the illicit traffic of art objects, however, the fifth factor has become
largely dormant and discredited. Id. at 230, 233, 236-37.
9. For example, it was recently reported that:
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, had blocked the
[implementation of the UNESCO Convention] in the past, partly on the behalf
of New York art dealers concerned that United States enforcement of the
UNESCO convention [sic] would mean that they would lose all their business to
the countries that did not enforce it
N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1982, at Cl, col. 1.
10. E.g., Nafziger, supra note 5, at 71; Rogers & Cohen, supra note 5, at 316.
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art into the country; for example, it has been noted that United States
customs laws have permitted certain art to enter the country duty-
free." An additional factor has been the allowance of a significant fed-
eral income tax deduction for certain art donations; donation of artistic
property to certain institutions has permitted the donor to deduct up
to 30% of adjusted gross income."' Significantly, the value of the dona-
tion is based upon the current market value of the gift at the time of
donation,1 3 as opposed to its value when the donor acquired it. Thus,
the incentive has existed for persons to speculate actively in art objects
on the expectation that market forces will cause them to appreciate,
thereby resulting in a windfall tax savings-should they later choose to
donate. "
The second and clearly most significant source of the allegation
that the United States encourages the importation of illicit art, is the
absence of laws dealing with the problem:
On the importing side [of the problem] the principal form of
regulation is a form of nonregulation, and. .. it is fundamen-
tal that this be understood. The general rule today in the
United States, and I think in almost all other art-importing
countries, is that it is not a violation of law to import simply
because an item has been illegally exported from another coun-
try .... The mere fact of illegal export does not render the
import of a work of art illegal under United States law. This
means that a person who imports a work of art which has been
illegally exported is not for that reason alone actionable [sic],
and the possession of that work of art cannot for that reason
alone be disturbed in the United States.18
It is difficult to pinpoint a specific reason for United States inac-
tion. Several possibilities exist, however. First, it is conceivable that
the United States was actually unaware of the magnitude of the prob-
lem; about fifteen years ago it became apparent that certain cultural
properties, notably pre-Columbian artifacts, were facing extinction due
11. Rogers & Cohen, supra note 5, at 316. The authors note that antiquities, ethno-
graphic objects more than fifty years old, and works of original art in general are benefi-
ciaries of this policy. Id.
12. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(i) (West 1982). See also Rogers & Cohen, supra note 5,
at 316.
13. I.R.C. § 170 (West 1982).
14. A further factor to consider, although not embodied in law, is the increasing
Western emphasis on higher education. It has been suggested that this emphasis has
produced a concomitant demand for "artistic experiences." Note, supra note 2, at 933.
15. Bator, supra note 8, at 300-01.
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to increased world demand and the destructive practices of illicit ex-
porters. 16 Thus, the United States may have been guilty of seriously
underestimating the substance of complaints frequently voiced by the
suffering art-rich countries. A second possibility is related to the idea
of "cultural imperialism."' 7 A nation takes pride in the quality of its
cultural institutions; by building a reputation for cultural and artistic
excellence, respect and prestige follow, thereby attesting to the success
and development of the social structure. Accordingly, the continued
import of culturally significant objects is not to be discouraged. Finally,
the economic philosophy of the United States is a relevant considera-
tion. The free market system has great support in the United States,
an adherent to a capitalistic economic philosophy. Hence, allowing
market forces to determine the overall distribution of cultural proper-
ties would naturally follow. Any governmental interference with mar-
ket operations would tend to be disfavored.
As a result of the general practice of allowing illegally exported
cultural properties legal entry into the United States, it is not surpris-
ing that it should emerge as a major destination point for the illicit
traffic. In the eyes of the art-rich nations, the United States resembles
an enormous warehouse of wrongfully taken property. For example, it
is not unusual for a country to discover one of its well-known treasures
appearing in an American collection,18 museum's or offered for sale in
an art catalogue.2
0
Given the United States previous general policy of nonregulation
of the influx of illegally exported cultural property, any subsequent
regulation thereof represents a contraction of the above-quoted general
rule. 21 Two considerations, however, have led the United States to
reevaluate its policy. The first is the remarkable increase in volume
16. Note, supra note 2, at 956; see supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
17. See Merryman, supra note 4, at 233, 236-37.
18. See, e.g., U.S. v. Hollingshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hollingshead in-
volved a prosecution for a violation of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
2314-2315 (1976). The offense was based on the defendant's illegal transportation of a
famous pre-Columbian stela, which later surfaced in the defendant's California based art
collection). See infra text accompanying notes 116-20.
19. A Raphael portrait, which had been illegally exported from Italy, was seized by
United States Customs officers from the Boston Museum of Fine Arts on January 7,
1971. The Customs Service was able to exercise jurisdiction because the painting had not
been declared upon entry into the United States and was technically contraband. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1971 § 1, at 1, col. 1.
20. Telephone interview with Charles Koczka, Special Agent, United States Customs
Service in New York City (Oct. 29, 1981).
21. Professor Bator feels that the fundamental policy issue in this area is the extent
to which an art-importing nation like the United States should modify this rule. Bator,
supra note 8, at 301.
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and sophistication of the traffic." The second factor concerns the
growth of a cultural awareness on the part of the citizens of art-rich
nations-citizens whose heritage is facing extinction." This is signifi-
cant because of a concomitant rise in American desire for the contin-
ued economic and political support of many of these art-laden Latin
American countries.24 Consequently, these countries have an important
bargaining chip with which they can influence United States foreign
policy with regard to controlling the flow of cultural property."
As many of the countries seeking to protect their cultural proper-
ties are politically and economically unable to exercise extensive con-
trol over them,' 6 major legal measures in the form of a multilateral
convention, bilateral treaties and unilateral legislation have been re-
sorted to, with United States participation in these measures beginning
in the early 1970's and gradually increasing thereafter.,
B. Multilateral Response: The UNESCO Convention
The UNESCO Convention' represents the potentially most effec-
tive legal device to arrest the illicit flow of cultural property. Only
through the process of mutual cooperation and recognition of shared
values and experiences among members of the global community will
there emerge effective regulation to eliminate the relative ease pres-
ently enjoyed by those who would seek to remove the property from
22. Note, supra note 2, at 956. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
23. Note, supra note 2, at 956. The author there notes that:
[TIhe 1960's brought rapid economic development to Latin America and the
growth of an educated middle class. To the educated citizen who knows that
these artifacts represent a background of highly advanced civilization, preserva-
tion of this heritage is a highly popular and political issue. Political pressure was
undoubtedly exerted on the United States to ameliorate the problem.
Id. at 956-57 (footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 957.
25. Id.
26. Nafziger, supra note 5, at 70. It is stated there that "(t]he property is largely
unprotected because of the prohibitive cost of an adequate cordon of guards. Bribery of
official guards, where there are any, is pervasive." Id. (footnote omitted).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 28-185.
28. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, at 289. For a thorough examination of the
Convention and its background, see WnIAMs, supra note 2, at 178-91; Note, supra note
2, at 948-68 (comparing the final draft with earlier versions and the United States' objec-
tions thereto); Comment, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art
Treasures, 12 HLAv. INT'L L. J. 537 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Illicit Move-
ment]. See generally Comment, New Legal Tools to Curb the Illicit Traffic in Pre-Co-
lumbian Artifacts, 12 COLUM. J. TRANST'L L. 316 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
New Legal Tools].
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one nation to another.3 ' The preamble to the Convention embodies
this recognition, which is the spirit and rationale behind its adoption."
The Convention, at the outset, specifies two requirements that cul-
tural property must satisfy in order to qualify for protection: (1) a defi-
nitional test and (2) a connection test.3 ' The definitional test demands
that cultural property first be designated, by each party to the Conven-
tion, on either religious or secular grounds, as being important to any
one of six academic areas of discipline." In addition, the property must
fall within one of eleven "type" categories."3 Upon meeting both parts
29. It has been widely acknowledged that one nation, acting alone in attempting to
restrict the importation of such items, will only cause the flow to be diverted to another
nation, where no such restrictions exist. E.g., Nafziger, supra note 5, at 77; Note, supra
note 7, at 110.
30. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, preamble, at 289. For example, aside from
its articulation of the transnational value and importance of cultural property with re-
gard to increased knowledge, mutual respect and appreciation, the preamble recognizes
the duty and obligation of all nations to become and remain sensitive to their own cul-
tural heritages and to undertake measures to ensure their protection and preservation.
Id. See WIijAms, supra note 2, at 180.
31. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 4, at 289-90. These tests are derived
from the language contained in articles 1 and 4 of the Convention. See Comment, Illicit
Movement, supra note 28, at 542-46; WnJJAMs, supra note 2, at 180-81.
32. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, at 289. The six academic areas are:
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art and science. Id.
33. Id. at 289-90. The list and description of the "type" categories are:
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and
objects of palaeontological interest;
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and technology
and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers,
scientists and artists and to events of national importance;
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine)
or of archaeological discoveries;
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites which
have been dismembered;
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and
engraved seals;
(f) objects of ethnological interest;
(g) property of artistic interest, such as:
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any sup-
port and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manufactured
articles decorated by hand);
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material;
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs;
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material;
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and publications of
special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in
collections;
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections;
19821
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of the definitional test, the cultural property must then pass muster
under the connection test embodied in article 4.34 This test requires a
sufficient nexus between a given object and the state seeking its protec-
tion. 0 Presumably, the connection test was designed to reduce the
chance that a given country will assert a parochial or spurious claim to
an item. Consequently, the movement of cultural property would not
be unduly burdened."
It has been advanced, however, that the connection test leaves
open serious questions which will undoubtedly give rise to disputess 7
For example, it has been observed that conflicts may arise where an
artist, native to one country, creates an important work in another
country where he has temporary residency." Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the commentator notes the obvious want of a priority system
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives;
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical
instruments.
Id. One writer has taken exception to the scope of this strand of the definitional test:
The inclusion of two of these categories gives cause for concern. Paragraph
(a) includes objects of purely scientific interest not peculiar to one country, but
of general interest to scientists all over the world. The controls established by
the convention are inappropriate for this type of material, for which ease of
transportation among scientists in different countries should be a primary
consideration.
Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 544-45. In addition, the author objects to
the inclusion of contemporary art and literature as failing to consider the possibilities
that wide circulation may outweigh protection. Id. at 545.
34. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, at 290.
35. Id. To meet this nexus, property must fall within one or more of the following
categories:
(a) Cultural property created by the individual or collective genius of nationals
of the State concerned or created within the territory of that State by for-
eign nationals or stateless persons resident within such territory;
(b) cultural property found within the national territory;
(c) cultural property acquired by archaeological, ethnological or natural science
missions, with the consent of the competent authorities of the country of
origin of such property;
(d) cultural property which has been the subject of a freely agreed exchange;
(e) cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally with the consent of
the competent authorities of the country of origin of such property.
Id.
36. Id. preamble, at 289. This interpretation comports with an express considertion
included in the preamble to the Convention: "[T]he interchange of cultural property
among nations for scientific, cultural and educational purposes increases the knowledge
of the civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual
respect and appreciation among nations.. . ..." Id.
37. Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 545.
38. Id.
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for the categories listed under the connection test, 9 and the absence of
any provision creating a "tribunal or agency for the resolution of dis-
putes," except as UNESCO will "extend its good offices to reach a
settlement. 4 1 Clearly these omissions significantly reduce the overall
effectiveness of the Convention, for the elimination of disputes over
cultural property was one of the stated purposes behind its creation."2
It should be borne in mind, however, that the Convention is but a
framework for controlling the illicit traffic in cultural goods. As con-
crete disputes arise, the opportunity will exist to confront directly any
glaring deficiencies or gaps in the framework, as opposed to approach-
ing them in the abstract. To this end, greater substantive content may
be added to the Convention in a manner similar to American constitu-
tional adjudication, where the text of the document, often ambiguous,
undergoes interpretation to reflect the shared values and expectations
of the persons it was designed to govern. Moreover, article 25 provides
that the Convention may be revised.' s Thus, the means exist by which
tribunals may be organized or a permanent arbitration panel
established.
In providing for enforcement, the Convention places duties upon
both the art-rich and the art-importing states. Article 5 requires par-
ties to the Convention to establish "national services" for the protec-
tion of cultural property where such services do not already exist."
The key to this obligation is the insertion of the qualification that ser-
vices are to be "appropriate for each country," thereby abrogating any
mandatory minimal level of authority which might otherwise be re-
quired.45 The functions such services are to perform include: (1) the
proposal of legislation to implement protection operations; (2) the su-
pervision of archeological excavations; (3) the establishment of ethical
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 17, at 292.
42. Id. preamble, at 289. The preamble notes that "the illicit traffic in cultural prop-
erty is an obstacle to that understanding between nations which it is part of Unesco's
mission to promote." Id.
43. Id. art. 25, at 293.
44. Id. art. 5, at 290. The Convention offers no express definition of "national ser-
vices" but does detail several functions they are to perform. Id.
45. Id. art. 5, at 290. It has been observed that the inclusion of the phrase "as appro-
priate for each country," while taking into account the particular conditions of each sig-
natory, renders the "[establishment of) such national services. . . merely admonitory,
since the United States, for example, could easily assert that the functions of the services
are already being performed 'appropriately' by such agencies as the Smithsonian Institu-
tion, the National Gallery of Art and federal, state and local law enforcement authori-
ties." Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 547. See WnmIAMs, supra note 2, at
181-82 nn. 180-81.
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standards for dealers and collectors of cultural property and (4) the
promotion of education, with the goal of encouraging respect for the
cultural heritages of other states.46
Dealing more directly with the problem of widespread illicit expor-
tation of cultural objects, article 6 requires that the parties to the Con-
vention draft a "certificate" which will state that the exportation of a
given item is permissible; exportation of any item covered by the Con-
vention is to be denied unless accompanied by such a certificate.' 7 This
"certificate" requirement has been severely criticized by legal writers."
Specifically, the problem of the administrative burdens in enforcement
is notable. The effect of the requirement is in essence to require pro-
tected property to possess a "passport." "[I]t must be admitted that
the practical difficulties of border enforcement, especially for a country
such as the United States with open borders for travelers leaving the
country would be very difficult."' The "certificate" requirement is im-
portant, despite the difficulties surrounding it, for it places a duty on
those nations which fear the destruction of their patrimonies to take
the first step in ameliorating a problem which affects them most. A
nation that would refuse to take significant measures towards cur-
tailing the outward flow of its cultural property should not be heard to
complain about the inaction of importing countries that contribute to
the problem. To a certain extent then, such export controls may be
seen as the quid pro quo for the import controls contained in article 7.
Article 7 provides for import control requirements. 0 Article 7(a)
states that the parties to the Convention agree to undertake those
measures "consistent with national legislation to prevent museums
and similar institutions ... from acquiring cultural property ...
which has been illegally exported."'" By adding the phrase "consistent
with national legislation," the control appears to be directed toward
46. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, at 290.
47. Id. art. 6, at 290-91.
48. E.g., Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 543, 548.
49. Id. at 548. In light of this difficulty the Senate ratified the Convention, but ex-
pressly reserved the right to avoid imposing export controls. S. Res. 129, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 118 CONG. Rac. 27,924-25 (1972). However, as the United States is essentially a
destination point for illicitly exported items, this reservation is believed to be of no real
consequence. Comment, New Legal Tools, supra note 28, at 334.
50. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, at 291. It should be noted that these
controls are not coextensive with the export controls required by article 6. Thus, in cer-
tain cases, the prevention of illicit exportation, without more, will not serve as an abso-
lute bar to importation in another country. See Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note
28, at 549. The author there notes that an earlier draft of the Convention did require
coextensive controls. Id.
51. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, at 291 (emphasis added).
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institutions that the governments of the parties to the Convention own
or operate.52 Thus, the door is left open for private institutions to ac-
quire illicitly exported items legally."'
Article 7(b)(i) places an absolute import ban on cultural property
in certain circumstances: (1) the item must have been stolen from a
museum or similar institution, or a religious or secular public monu-
ment and (2) the property must have been documented in the inven-
tory of such institution." A close reading of the section reveals how
this provides only narrow coverage. First, the distinction is made be-
tween stolen property and that which has been merely exported illic-
itly. Article 3 defines "illicit" as "the import, export, or transfer of
ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the provisions
adopted under this Convention.""' Thus, by the insertion of the word
"stolen" in article 7, the implication is clear that the drafters intended
the term to connote larceny or theft; hence, "stolen" is used in its con-
ventional sense. Therefore, article 7(b)(i) would appear inapplicable to
the situation where a cultural item is merely exported without authori-
zation. Second, the item stolen must have been taken from a specified
class of victims, i.e., a museum or similar institution; property stolen
from an individual's home would not be subject to the import ban.
Article 7(b)(ii) provides for the return of property stolen under ar-
ticle 7(b)(i).ss In particular, importing states are "to take appropriate
steps to recover and return" such stolen property provided that the
52. See Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 550. Indeed, this was the in-
terpretation given to the phrase by the Senate when it ratified the Convention subject to
the express understanding that "Article 7(a) is to apply to institutions whose acquisition
policy is subject to national control under existing domestic legislation and does not...
require the enactment of new legislation to establish national control over other institu-
tions." S. Res. 129, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CoNG. REc. 27,924-25 (1972). See Note,
supra note 2, at 960-62; Comment, New Legal Tools, supra note 28, at 334. This appears
to be a serious blow to the proponents of restricted movement of cultural property. Con-
gressional power to regulate foreign commerce, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
would presumably allow the contemplated control over private institutions' acquisition
policies in this area. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). As an alternative,
such legislation is arguably sustainable under the Treaty Power of Article VI of the Con-
stitution. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
(dictum).
It has been suggested that the coverage of article 7(a) might extend to museums
whose activities are occasionally subject to governmental control or which receive tax
advantages. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 183-84 nn. 215-18. Given congressional reluctance
to enact new legislation to cover private institutions undoubtedly within its power, this
suggestion is likely to be ignored at this time.
53. Note, supra note 2, at 960-61.
54. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, at art. 7(b)(i).
55. Id. art. 3.
56. Id. art. 7(b)(ii).
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country requesting the return of the particular item pay just compen-
sation to an innocent purchaser or one who has valid title.'1 In addi-
tion, only states may utilize the Convention's recovery machinery; the
individual private litigant must resort to other existing legal means of
recovery.56
Article 9 provides for what one commentator has referred to as
"the 'emergency' provision." 5' This allows one country to call upon
other parties "to participate in a concerted international effort" to
eliminate the pillaging of its patrimony, where such covert activity has
been so extensive as to place it in serious jeopardy.s The article con-
templates action such as a complete control of imports and exports, as
well as multilateral and bilateral agreements apart from the Conven-
tion itself."'
1. United States Participation
The Senate ratified the Convention by providing its advice and
consent on August 11, 1972." The ratification was qualified, however,
by six express understandings and a reservation." Clearly the most
57. Id. The Senate expressed an understanding, upon ratification, that article 7(b)
does not preclude other available remedies that may already exist under the respective
laws of the participating nations where such remedies would allow recovery without pay-
ment of just compensation. S. Res. 129, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 27,924-25
(1972). As a result, the Convention's use would be limited to cases where the possessor
does hold valid title as against the original owner. Comment, Illicit Movement, supra
note 28, at 550-51.
58. Note, supra note 7, at 112-13; Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 550.
For example, a private party might institute an action against the good itself under
United States law. Note, supra, at 112-13.
59. Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 552-53.
60. UNESCO Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, at 291.
61. Comment, Illicit Movement, supra note 28, at 552-53.
.62. S. Res. 129, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rac. 27,924-25 (1972).
63. Id. These qualifications are as follows:
The United States reserved the right to determine whether or not to impose
export controls over cultural property.
The United States understands the provisions of the Convention to be
neither self-executing nor retroactive.
The United States understands Article 3 not to modify property interest in
cultural property under the laws of the states parties.
The United States understands Article 7(a) to apply to institutions whose
acquisition policy is subject to national control under existing domestic legisla-
tion and not to require the enactment of new legislation to establish national
control over other institutions.
The United States understands that Article 7(b) is without prejudice to
other remedies, civil or penal, available under the laws of the states parties for
the recovery of stolen cultural property to the rightful owner without payment
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critical of the understandings was that the Convention was not to be
self-executing or retroactive. As a result, the Convention was without
force in the United States until Congress enacted the necessary imple-
menting legislation."4
C. Bilateral Response: United States-Mexico Treaty
The United States-Mexico Treaty" represents a type of action
contemplated by article 9 of the UNESCO Convention." It was written
in recognition of the severe problem Mexico faced during the 1960's
when Mayan ruins were being desecrated at an alarming rate.6 7 The
Treaty had its origin in a meeting between the American and Mexican
Presidents in 1967, although it was not the subject of a formal Mexican
request until 1969.0' There was a spirit of close cooperation and reci-
procity behind the adoption of the instrument; Mexico had historically
assisted the United States in the latter's efforts to eliminate the cross-
or compensation. The United States is further prepared to take additional steps
contemplated by Article 7(b)(ii) for the return of covered stolen cultural prop-
erty without payment or compensation, except to the extent required by the
Constitution of the United States, for those states parties that agree to do the
same for the United States institutions.
The United States understands the words "as appropriate for each country"
in Article 10(a) as permitting each state party to determine the extent of regula-
tion, if any, of antique dealers and declares that in the United States that deter-
mination would be made by the appropriate authorities of state and municipal
governments.
The United States understands Article 13(d) as applying to objects removed
from the country of origin after the entry into force of this Convention, for the
states concerned and, as stated by the Chairman of the Special Committee of
Governmental Exports that prepared the text, and reported in paragraph 23 of
the Report of that Committee, the means of recovery of cultural property under
subparagraph (d) are the judicial actions referred to in subparagraph (c) of Arti-
cle 13, and that such actions are controlled by the law of the requested State,
the requesting State having to submit necessary proofs.
Id.
64. After approximately eleven years of effort, the Convention was finally imple-
mented on January 12, 1983. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub.
L. No. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2350 (1983) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-13) [hereinafter
cited as Implementation Act]. See infra text accompanying notes 151-85 for full discus-
sion of this legislation.
65. Treaty for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cul-
tural Properties, July 17, 1970, United States-Mexico, 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7988
(entered into force, March 24, 1971) [hereinafter cited as United States-Mexico Treaty].
66. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
67. See Nafziger, supra note 5, at 68-69.
68. Id. at 71. See Note, supra note 2, at 943; Comment, New Legal Tools, supra note
28, at 320 & n.20.
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border traffic in stolen cars, marijuana and narcotics." By signing the
Treaty, therefore, the United States was essentially returning a favor.70
In its short introduction, the Treaty cites this "spirit of close coop-
eration" and notes the common value, also expressed in the UNESCO
Convention, of promoting the protection of and further education in
property of cultural significance.7" Specifically, the Treaty sets forth
four measures primarily designed to eliminate the destructive conse-
quences of illicit thefts and excavations:
1. The Parties undertake individually and, as appropriate,
jointly,
(a) to encourage the discovery, excavation, preservation,
and study of archaeological sites and materials by
qualified scientists and scholars of both countries;
(b) to deter illicit excavations of archeological sites and
the theft of archaeological, historical or cultural
properties;
(c) to facilitate the circulation and exhibit in both coun-
tries of archaeological, historical and cultural proper-
ties in order to enhance the mutual understanding and
appreciation of the artistic and cultural heritage of the
two countries; and
(d) consistent with the laws and regulations assuring the
conservation of national archaeological, historical and
cultural properties, to permit legitimate international
commerce in art objects.7"
These measures represent a positive plan to combat the problems
caused by illicit traffic in cultural goods. By encouraging discovery and
study of such property by qualified scholars and scientists, systematic
detailed inquiry will replace the wanton pillage and destruction typi-
cally associated with the illicit movement. In addition, by promoting
legitimate international commerce in art, the incentive for the "black-
market" will be reduced.
The types of property covered by the Treaty are defined in article
69. Nafziger, supra note 5, at 71-72; Note, supra note 2, at 943.
70. It should be noted that American interest in maintaining good political and eco-
nomical relations with the Latin American countries in general was an influence in the
United States' willingness to sign such a treaty. Nafziger, supra note 4, at 71. See supra
text accompanying notes 25-27.
71. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 65, at 495; UNESCO Convention, supra
note 1, preamble at 289.
72. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 65, art. II.
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I. In referring to pre-Columbian artifacts and art objects, only such
items which are "of outstanding importance to the national patri-
mony" of each country are included. 8 While this would appear to indi-
cate a rather broad class, the scope of the coverage is narrowed by
other clauses. First, the property must have been stolen, as contrasted
with that which has been only exported without authorization.74 Sec-
ond, the property must belong to the "federal, state, or municipal gov-
ernments or their instrumentalities,"7 thus excluding privately owned
items. Despite these limitations, the definitions are essentially flexible
since the Treaty stipulates that the application of the definitions to a
particular item is to be made by agreement between the two parties."
Article III provides for the return of stolen cultural property cov-
ered by the Treaty. Upon request made through diplomatic offices,
77
the party requested is "to employ the legal means at its disposal" to
effectuate the property's recovery and return from its jurisdiction, 78
provided it is furnished with evidence and documentation establishing
the requesting nation's claim.7' The Treaty does not define the "legal
means" contemplated by article III. It should be noted, however, that
the United States Customs Service is able to recover art objects under
certain circumstances, such as where an object has not been declared 0
or has been declared falsely. 1 Presumably this type of action is within
the purview of the Treaty. In the event that property cannot be recov-
ered and returned by such "legal means," the Attorney General of each
73. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 65, art. I1, para. 3.
74. Id. preamble.
75. Id.
76. Id. art. I, para. 2. In the event that the two parties fail to reach an agreement, a
"panel of qualified experts whose appointment and procedures shall be described by the
two governments" will make the determination. Id.
77. Id. art. III, para. 2.
78. Id. art. III, para. 1.
79. Id. art. III, para. 2.
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (1976).
81. 19 U.S.C. 1592(c)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Specifically, subsection (5) provides
in relevant part:
If the Secretary [of the Treasury] has reasonable cause to believe that [an
intentional or negligent false declaration has been made and]... that seizure is
otherwise essential ... to prevent the introduction of prohibited or restricted
merchandise into ... the United States, then such merchandise may be seized
and, upon assessment of a monetary penalty, forfeited unless the monetary pen-
alty is paid within the time specified by law.... After seizure of merchandise
under this subsection, the Secretary may, in the case of restricted merchan-
dise .... return such merchandise upon the deposit of security....
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the availability of this law as a means of enabling Customs
officials to recover an item would appear to depend upon the item having been classified
as restricted or prohibited and whether or not the monetary penalty was paid.
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nation is empowered to institute a civil action to this end in the appro-
priate district court of their respective countries.8 2 To be noted is the
inclusion of the sentence: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be deemed to
alter the domestic law of the Parties otherwise applicable to such pro-
ceedings."8 By implication then, the Treaty appears to allow the
United States to act as plaintiff on behalf of the Mexican Government,
utilizing any available civil causes of action and thus relieving Mexico
from the burden of pursuing a lawsuit in a foreign tribunal.
Article V is in the nature of a "supremacy clause." Specifically, it
provides that in the event property covered by the Treaty is seized by,
or is seized by and forfeited to the party to whom a request has been
made for its recovery and return, the processes established by article
III are controlling.8 This is so regardless of any inconsistent statutory
requirements that may otherwise be applicable where property has
been illegally imported into either country. 5
The obligation of the United States under this document cannot
be fully appreciated without a brief discussion of the applicable Mexi-
can law. Beginning in 1897, Mexico has enacted a series of laws detail-
ing its interest in pre-Columbian artifacts and demonstrating its intent
to exercise strict control over their transfer and exportation. 6 In 1970,
Mexico adopted legislation which vested ownership in the nation of im-
movable archaeological monuments and smaller movable items found
in or on them.87 In 1972, this ownership right was reaffirmed and ex-
tended to movable artifacts as well, notwithstanding the fact that
many such artifacts were, and continue to be, in the possession of pri-
vate Mexican collectors.88 Thus, it is evident that since the Mexican
82. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 65, art. III, para. 3.
83. Id. Another writer has stated that "no new causes of action are created under the
instrument. . ." Comment, New Legal Tools, supra note 28, at 321.
84. United States-Mexico Treaty, supra note 65, art. V.
85. Id.
86. E.g., Law on Archaeological Monuments, D.O., May 11, 1897, cited in U.S. v.
McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 997 (5th Cir. 1977) (providing a chronological analysis of Mexi-
can law relating to such property); Law for the Protection and Preservation of Archaeo-
logical and Historic Monuments, Typical Towns and Places of Scenic Beauty, 82 D.O.
152, January 19, 1934, cited in 545 F.2d at 998.
87. Federal Law Concerning Cultural Patrimony of the Nation of December 16, 1970,
art. 52, 303 D.O. 8, cited in U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d at 999. See also WiULL a, supra
note 2, at 132; Note, supra note 2, at 944-45; Comment, New Legal Tools, supra note 28,
at 326-27. Article 50 defines archaeological monuments as all artifacts, movable and im-
movable, which were the products of the pre-Columbian cultures. Comment, New Legal
Tools, supra note 28, at 327-28 & n.14.
88. Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones, art.
27, 312 D.O. 16, May 6, 1972, cited in U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000. Article 27
provides: "Archaeological monuments, movable and immovable, are the inalienable and
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Government has made itself the "owner" of all pre-Columbian artifacts
found within its territory, the United States would appear bound to
use legal means to bring about their recovery and return if imported,
assuming of course that the act of illegal exportation under these cir-
cumstances renders such items "stolen" within the meaning of the
Treaty."' It has been suggested that the severe limitations placed on
legal exports" will not work to undermine the Treaty since exporta-
tions will be allowed for purposes of cultural exchange when arrange-
ments are made by the Mexican President." Regardless of this possi-
bility, however, it would appear that the United States obligation has,
on the whole, been significantly increased, and its desire, expressed in
article II, to permit legal and legitimate commerce in art objects, has
been effectively undercut with respect to pre-Columbian artifacts, for
such limited legal exports will undoubtedly fall far short of satisfying
the demand for cultural properties of the pre-Columbian era.
The United States-Mexico Treaty has a distinct practical advan-
tage over a multilateral agreement such as the UNESCO Convention;
it has been recognized that such bilateral agreements allow the parties
to draw terms with more precision to suit their individual needs.'" In
this respect, bilateral agreements tend to supplement the underlying
policy expressed in the UNESCO Convention. Moreover, the Treaty
represents a growing recognition on the part of the United States of its
role in the extensive problems Mexico faces as the result of widespread
looting of pre-Columbian artifacts. The values and goals listed in the
Treaty indicate an increased readiness of the United States to look be-
yond the parochial interests tied to a philosophy based on the free
movement of cultural property, toward larger transnational values in-
herent in the educated, ordered and professional study of art.
imprescriptible property of the Nation." Id. Article 16 provides that "the exportation of
archaeological monuments is prohibited with the exception of exchanges or donations
made to foreign Governments or scientific institutions by Presidential agreement." Id.
art. 16. Thus it can be seen that legal exportation is limited to this narrow exception.
Wn.LIAMS, supra note 2, at 132; Note, supra note 2, at 944-45; Comment, New Legal
Tools, supra note 28, at 326-28.
89. Cf. U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d 998 (illegal exportation sufficient act of conversion
to bring the National Stolen Property Act into play given Mexican Government's owner-
ship of the goods exported). See infra text accompanying notes 117-27.
90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
91. Note, supra note 2, at 944-45.
92. Id. at 942.
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D. United States Unilateral Response
In October of 1972, Congress imposed a significant qualification on
the general rule of allowing the legal entry of cultural property that has
been illegally exported from another country.98 This qualification came
in the form of national legislation aimed specifically at certain types of
pre-Columbian art.94 This legislation differs markedly from the United
States-Mexico Treaty in two important substantive aspects. First,
there is no requirement that the cultural property covered by the legis-
lation be stolen; all that is necessary to bring the Act into play is that
the property be "subject to export control by the country of origin."
Accordingly, the fact that a foreign country has declared that this type
of property cannot be legally exported will suffice to bring it within the
scope of the law. Second, the law is not limited to those countries that
have signed an international agreement with the United States; nations
which do in fact exercise such export control are eligible to be the law's
beneficiaries."
The limitations of the law are found in the manner by which its
parameters are determined. By definition, the law applies only to "pre-
Columbian monumental or architectural sculpture[s] or mural[s],"
meaning "any stone carving or wall art" which was the product of the
pre-Columbian cultures of Latin America and was, in whole or in part,
"an immovable monument or architectural structure."'7 Realizing the
vagueness of this definition, Congress directed the Secretary of the
Treasury, upon consultation with the Secretary of State, to promulgate
and revise lists of objects that will fall within the definition of the
Act.' 8 One can therefore see that this legislation is far from a blanket
prohibition concerning pre-Columbian art.
The mechanics of the statute are relatively simple. Assuming a
person desires to import a pre-Columbian artifact into the United
93. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
94. Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or
Murals, 19 U.S.C. § 2091-2095 (1976).
95. Id. at § 2095(3)(A)(iii). The phrase "country of origin" is further defined to mean
"the country where such [property covered by the Act] was first discovered." Id. at §
2095(4).
96. 19 C.F.R. § 12.105(a) (1983) (promulgating the list of countries that are affected
by the statute: Belize, Bolivia, British Honduras, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and
Venezuela).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 2095(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
98. 19 U.S.C. § 2091. This task was accomplished on May 2, 1973, when the Federal
Register published expanded definitions of the term "stone carving or wall art." 38 Fed.
Reg. 10, 807 (1973) (codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.105-.109). The regulations became effec-
tive on June 1, 1973. Id. § 12.106. See Note, supra note 2, at 941 n.46.
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States, he/she must present a certificate to customs officers, issued by
the country of origin, certifying that the exportation of that item was
legal. 9" Failure to produce a certificate results in the seizure of the item
at the expense of the person seeking its admission.1 00 After seizure, the
person ordinarily has 90 days in which to produce the certificate or else
the item is forfeited under existing customs laws.' 0 1 There is an excep-
tion, however. A person may produce evidence sufficient to establish
that the particular item is not protected by the statute or was exported
prior to the date of its effective coverage.102 If the item is forfeited for
violation of the statute, the item is first offered to the country of origin
for return; the item will be returned provided that such country as-
sumes all expenses associated with the return.10 3 Where no such return
is made, the object is disposed of according to the applicable customs
laws. , "
The statute has acknowledged significance in that it further dem-
onstrates the United States concern regarding the overall status of cul-
tural property that was seen to emerge in the terms of the United
States-Mexico Treaty. 08 The statute also provides the basis for repel-
ling the flow of cultural property at the border without having to resort
to action in an attempt to recover and return such property after it has
been relocated in an American museum or private collection.'" Given
liberal enforcement, moreover, the difficulty in importing illegally ex-
ported cultural property will be clearly increased.10 7 Finally, given that
the United States unquestionably houses a large portion of the market
for illicitly exported cultural property, the statute may have great sig-
nificance as a precedent for other art-importing states to follow. Art-
rich nations now have a stronger argument to present to other import-
ing countries, in that their repeated pleas for assistance are no longer
falling on deaf ears. Accordingly, such art-rich nations would be more
justified in exerting stronger political and economic pressure to bear on
99. 19 U.S.C. § 2092(a).
100. Id. § 2092(b). The expenses involved are for storage in "a bonded warehouse or
public store." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 2092(b)(2)-(3). The effective date will depend upon when the particular
object was declared to be within the statutory coverage. See id. § 2091.
103. Id. § 2093.
104. Id. § 2093(c).
105. See Comment, New Legal Tools, supra note 28, at 323.
106. See, e.g., U.S. v. Hollingshead, 495 F.2d 1154. See infra text accompanying notes
111-18.
107. Comment, New Legal Tools, supra note 28, at 323. The author there notes, how-
ever, that the law is far from "a final solution." Like any customs law, it lends itself to
evasion and is subject to administrative problems. Id.
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noncompliant countries. Whether or not this will occur remains to be
seen.
Judicial action in this area has been scarce. Thus far, the only
demonstrated judicial basis available to deter the traffic in illicitly ex-
ported items has been the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).'O
The ability to utilize this statute turns on the question of scienter: in
order to be convicted under the NSPA, a defendant must have knowl-
edge that the goods in which he deals or transports were stolen.' 0 ' In
United States v. Hollingshead,1" 0 the defendant was a well-known Cal-
ifornian art dealer who was convicted of transporting a famous Guate-
malan stela in interstate commerce knowing it to have been stolen."'
Under Guatemalan law, the stela involved was the property of the Re-
public and could not be exported without governmental permission,
which was not given. 1 2 Defendant's appeal was based on a contention
that the trial judge committed reversible error by instructing the jury
that there is a presumption that "every person knows what the law
forbids." ' s Defendant argued that since it is Guatemalan law that ren-
ders the stela stolen property, there could be no presumption of knowl-
edge of that country's law. " The court rejected this argument, point-
ing out that the evidence was "overwhelming" that the defendant was
aware that the stela was stolen under Guatemalan law. 1 Moreover,
this conclusion was particularly compelling since the stela involved was
so well known and had even been named."1 When this fact was consid-
ered along with the judge's further instruction that the jury must find
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the stela was stolen,
any error committed by the earlier instruction was, in the court's opin-
ion, nonprejudicial. 1 7
In HoUingshead, the element of scienter was easily established due
to the notoriety of the object involved. The Fifth Circuit, however, was
confronted with a much more difficult problem in United States v. Mc-
108. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1976). This act imposes fines and/or imprisonment on
persons who transport goods in interstate or foreign commerce, or receive, counsel, store,
barter, or sell goods which constitute commerce, knowing them to have been stolen. The
value of the goods must exceed five thousand dollars.
109. Id.
110. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
111. Id. at 1155.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The name of the object was Machaquilla Stele 2. Id.
117. Id. at 1156.
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Clain.118 In McClain, the defendants were appealing from a conviction
for the attempted sale of movable pre-Columbian artifacts to an under-
cover F.B.I. agent."' The artifacts in question had been smuggled out
of Mexico, which has absolutely prohibited the exportation of such
items since 1972.120 In their attempts to sell the artifacts, the defen-
dants had made statements indicating their awareness that Mexico did
not permit such exportations."'1 Accordingly, the defendants did not
dispute the illegality of the export, but primarily contended that a
Mexican legislative declaration of ownership does not bring the arti-
facts under the classification of "stolen" once they are illegally ex-
ported; thus, to apply the NSPA to a case of mere illegal exportation
would be an unwarranted enforcement of foreign law.122 The court re-
jected this contention and held that a declaration of national owner-
ship coupled with an illegal exportation renders the objects "stolen"
within the meaning of the NSPA.12 1 The court refused to adopt a strict
construction of the word "stolen" as used in the NSPA; it felt that a
narrow construction "would violate the apparent objective of Congress:
the protection of owners of stolen property.' ' 2 4
The defendants further argued that to refer to any foreign law for
purposes of ascertaining what is or is not "stolen" would render uncer-
tain the administration of the NSPA. 1 25 In response, the court stated
that the requirement of scienter precluded the possibility of a defen-
dant being convicted of an offense "he could not have understood to
exist. 1' 2 6 Nonetheless, whether such a requirement does preclude such
a possibility is uncertain. One writer has taken the position that, be-
cause the defendants only expressed knowledge that Mexican law for-
bade the exportation of such artifacts, for a conviction to be sustained
necessarily implied that the defendants were also aware that Mexico
had claimed ownership of the items. 2 7 This knowledge was not clearly
118. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977). For a detailed analysis of this decision, see Com-
ment, Art Theft: National Stolen Property Act Applied to Nationalized Mexican Pre-
Columbian Artifacts, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'" 569 (1978).
119. 545 F.2d at 992.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
121. 545 F.2d at 993.
122. Id. at 994.
123. Id. at 1000-01.
124. Id. at 1001.
125. Id. at 1001-02 n.30.
126. Id.
127. Comment, supra note 118, at 604-05. As scienter is the mens rea under the
NSPA, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt. See generally In Re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970). Defendant's conviction, therefore, implies the scienter of Mexico's
claim to ownership. 397 U.S. at 358.
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shown to exist on the defendants' part and thus, a due process ques-
tion arose.128 The defendants' convictions were reversed, however, be-
cause of an erroneous instruction that Mexico had owned such artifacts
since 1897."9 This instruction was considered prejudicial because the
jury could have been more willing to find scienter if Mexico had in fact
claimed ownership for over seventy-five years when it had not unequiv-
ocally done so until 1972.1o
E. Recent Developments
On September 15, 1981, the United States entered into an interna-
tional agreement with Peru for the recovery and return of stolen
archaeological, historical and cultural properties.81 This Agreement es-
sentially parallels the 1970 United States-Mexico Treaty,1 32 but con-
tains two modifications worthy of discussion. The first of these modifi-
cations may be described as an "early-warning system." The United
States-Peru Agreement places upon each party the duty to inform the
other of known thefts of protected property when there is a likelihood
that such stolen property will be placed in international trade. " ' In
addition, the party believing its property stolen is to furnish a descrip-
tion of it to the other in order to facilitate its identification.1" Thereaf-
ter, the customs services of each country are to "take such actions as
may be lawful and practicable to detect the entry of such objects into
[their respective countries] and to locate such objects within
[them]."' " Upon location of any property meeting the description of
that reported stolen, the locating party is to provide the other with
information as to the property's whereabouts and the procedure re-
128. More specifically, if the defendants were unaware that Mexico "owned" the arti-
facts, the requisite culpable mental state was lacking and hence the defendants would
have been deprived of due process of law. See generally In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358.
129. U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000.
130. Id. Defendants were again convicted upon retrial. The convictions were reversed,
however, in U.S. v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979).
The basis for reversal was the trial judge's action of allowing the jury to decide when
Mexico validly declared ownership of the artifacts in question. The court found it was
only since 1972 that Mexico made a clear pronouncement of ownership. As the jury could
have concluded that Mexico owned the property since 1897, the defendants stood in dan-
ger of being convicted under a vague articulation of a criminal prescription. Id. at 671.
131. Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and
Cultural Properties, Sept. 15, 1981, United States-Peru, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S.
No. 10136 [hereinafter cited as United States-Peru Agreement].
132. See supra text accompanying notes 65-93.
133. United States-Peru Agreement, supra note 131, art. II, para. 1.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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quired to secure its return." "
This modification is a significant improvement over the United
States-Mexico Treaty. The idea of an "early-warning system" is a use-
ful concept because it places the warned party on guard as to a possi-
ble attempt at importation. The United States Customs Service, if
properly informed, could effectively step-up its ordinary detection
practices if it was provided with knowledge of exactly what to look for
and, if possible, when and where. Also, by informing the country seek-
ing recovery of a stolen item of the steps involved in its return, that
country can properly weigh the merits of its return against the time
and expense necessary to accomplish it.
The second modification involves the means available to the re-
quested party for the recovery and return of a stolen item. The Agree-
ment places each nation under an obligation to employ the legal means
at its disposal to bring about an object's return upon request of the
other; the Agreement, however, unlike the United States-Mexico
Treaty, does not expressly authorize the Attorney General of either
country to institute a civil action to accomplish this return when other
means fail. Instead, in the event that legal authorization cannot be ob-
tained, the requested party is to "do everything possible to protect the
legal rights of the requesting Party and facilitate its bringing a private
action for return of the property. 1 3 7
It would appear that this Agreement is somewhat of a step back-
ward in the effort to control the illicit traffic in pre-Columbian art.
Although the Agreement provides for enhanced detection procedures
calling for more cooperation between the two nations, its procedures
for protecting the integrity of cultural patrimony accomplish very little
by requiring the requesting party to resort to a lawsuit in a foreign
tribunal when other attempts to recover property fail. Whether or not
the omission of the ability to institute a civil suit on the part of the
requested party is of consequence remains to be seen. The Agreement
does indicate, however, the continued willingness of the United States
to work with other nations in rectifying the destructive results associ-
ated with the illegal exportation of cultural property.
A second recent development merits attention because of its some-
what imaginative character. The United States Customs Service is pur-
portedly "testing its ability" to institute criminal proceedings against
persons who import cultural property claimed as national patrimony
by other countries. ' u Primarily, the prosecution would be based upon
136. Id.
137. Id. art. II, para. 4.
138. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
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the smuggling law under which the Customs Service is empowered to
seek a criminal prosecution where property is brought into the United
States "contrary to law. ' 13 9 It is then argued that the "contrary to law"
requirement is met once property, which has been declared to belong
to a foreign nation, is illegally exported resulting in a violation of the
National Stolen Property Act. 40 This theory would appear to be under
the authority of United States v. McClain.14' The legitimacy of this
theory would appear to be doubtful given the problems associated with
the McClain decision itself. 42 The United States willingness to pursue
139. 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1976).
140. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1976). This theory, of course, assumes that the property
involved exceeds $5,000 in value, as this minimum amount is required to bring the
NSPA into play. Id.
141. 545 F.2d 988.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28. Also casting doubt on the availabil-
ity of this theory was a bill, introduced on September 28, 1982, which would have
amended the NSPA to overrule the McClain decision. This bill was not enacted by the
97th Congress. S. 2963, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The bill reads:
To amend sections 2314 and 2315 of title 18, United States Code, relating to
stolen archaeological material.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That section 2314 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
'No archaeological or ethnological material taken from a foreign government
or country claiming ownership shall be considered as stolen, converted, or taken
by fraud within the meaning of this section where the claim of ownership is
based only upon-
'(1) a declaration by the foreign government of national ownership of the
material; or
'(2) other acts by the foreign government intended to establish ownership of
the material and functionally equivalent to a declaration of national ownership,
and the alleged act of stealing, converting, or taking is based only upon-
'(A) illegal export of the material from the foreign country;
'(B) the defendant's knowledge of the illegal export; and
'(C) the claim of ownership described in clauses (1) and (2).'.
Sec. 2. Section 2315 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following:
'No archaeological or ethnological material taken from a foreign government
or country claiming ownership shall be considered as stolen, unlawfully con-
verted, or taken within the meaning of this section where the claim of ownership
is based only upon-
'(1) a declaration by the foreign government of national ownership of the
material; and
'(2) other acts by the foreign government intended to establish ownership of
the material and functionally equivalent to a declaration of national ownership,
and the alleged act of stealing, converting, or taking is based only upon-
'(A) illegal export of the material from the foreign country;
'(B) the defendant's knowledge of the illegal export; and
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this theory, however, again testifies to its continued sensitivity to the
problems inherent in this area.
The Customs Service has the ability, in certain circumstances, to
seek prosecutions directly without resort to the NSPA. Intentionally
false declarations, for example, may result in a criminal conviction
under federal law.1 4 3 On January 26, 1982, a New York City art im-
porter pleaded guilty to filing a false customs declaration which had
undervalued $228,000 worth of Peruvian pre-Columbian artifacts.1 4' It
has been reported that Federal prosecutors are continuing their inves-
tigation of pre-Columbian art imports, 1 4 thus confirming the United
States' accelerated commitment to rectifying the damage caused by the
illicit traffic.
Clearly the most significant development in this area, however,
was the implementation of the UNESCO Convention by the United
States on January 12, 1983.146 This enactment represents the culmina-
tion of over eleven years of effort 4 7 to draw an acceptable compromise
between those groups and individuals who argued for immediate action
by the United States for reasons of principle and leadership 1 48 and
those who argued that existing proposals created overly broad restric-
tions and may have fostered unwarranted retention practices and poli-
cies by certain foreign governments."
The Implementation Act 1 "5 "substantially emulates" an earlier
bill1 51 passed by the House in 1977 and "implements the essential obli-
'(B) the defendant's knowledge of the illegal export; and
'(C) the claim of ownership described in clauses (1) and (2).'.
Id.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1976). This section deals with false statements made, without
reasonable cause to believe the truth thereof, upon entry or attempted entry of imported
merchandise into United States commerce. Punishment may involve a fine of up to
$5,000 and/or imprisonment of not more than two years. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976)
provides for criminal sanctions for false statements in general, without specific reference
to the importation of merchandise.
144. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, § 1, at 14, col. 6.
145. Id.
146. Implementation Act, supra note 64. See supra text accompanying notes 28-64
for a discussion of the Convention and United States participation therein.
147. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 3403
Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979) (statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Advisor, Depart-
ment of State).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 61 (statement of James Berry Hill).
150. See supra note 64.
151. H.R. 5643, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See H.R. REP. No. 615, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). See also S. Rzp. No. 56, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982).
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gations of the Cultural Property Convention."' ' 2 In describing the ma-
terial falling within the scope of the Act, § 302 requires that archaeo-
logical material be of cultural significance, at least 250 years old and be
"normally discovered as a result of scientific excavation, clandestine or
accidental digging, or exploration on land or underwater.' 5 3 Ethnolog-
ical material must be a "product of a tribal or nonindustrial society"
and be "important to the cultural heritage of a people because of its
distinctive characteristics, comparative rarity, or its contribution to the
knowledge of the origins, development, or history of that people."'"
Moreover, these items must have been first discovered in and subject
to export control by a "State Party." 5
Sections 303-305 and 307 implement article 9 of the UNESCO
Convention.'" Section 303 grants substantive authority to "the Presi-
dent to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements intended to pro-
ride [United States] cooperation towards protecting" against wanton
pillage or destruction of another State Party's cultural patrimony. "5
The protection contemplated is in the form of import restrictions; im-
portation of "designated archaeological or ethnological material" is
precluded unless the items are accompanied by a certificate or docu-
mentation, issued by the State Party, certifying the legality of the ex-
portation of the items.15 8 The President's authority to enter into such
agreements is qualified, however, by several prerequisite findings in-
cluding a request by a State Party for United States assistance;' 5 9 that
prior protective measures have been taken by the State Party;' 60 that
United States action "would be of substantial benefit" to deter pillage
"if applied in concert with similar restrictions" which are or will be
adopted by other importing nations;"' and that such action is in the
"interest of the international community" regarding the study of such
152. Id.
153. Implementation Act, supra note 64, § 302(2)(C)(i)(I)-(III).
154. Id. § 302(2)(C)(ii)(I)-(II).
155. Id. § 302(2). It was reported that these careful definitions are designed to mirror
the United States concern that only truly significant and valuable objects will be ex-
tended protection rather than "trinkets and other objects" which are basically non-dis-
tinctive and have little historical value. S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1982).
156. S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1982). The Senate report refers to §§
203-205, 207 of the Act, but these sections were renumbered as §§ 303-305, 307 in the
final version of the Act. Id.
157. S. REP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1982).
158. Implementation Act, supra note 64, § 307(a).
159. Id. § 303(a)(1).
160. Id. § 303(a)(1)(B).
161. Id. § 303(a)(1)(C)(i).
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property.162
The Act makes clear that the President is not to enter into such
agreements unless the other art-importing nations of the global com-
munity act accordingly.168 To provide flexibility, however, a limited ex-
ception was made to this "concerted effort" requirement; the President
may enter into such executive agreements notwithstanding the failure
of another importing nation to implement similar protective measures
where: (1) restrictions by that nation "are not essential to deter a seri-
ous situation of pillage" and (2) the United States participation will
still be part of a concerted effort undertaken by the remaining art-
importing countries.'"
Additional features of this agreement-making authority include:
(1) a directive to the President to suspend United States participation
in import restrictions if other importers either fail to act or do so inad-
equately to deter pillage1s5 and (2) power to extend an agreement up to
five years beyond the ordinary five year effective period.'"
Section 304 contemplates the emergency implementation of the
import restrictions of § 307, that is, without the prior conclusion of an
executive agreement. 67 This emergency authority contains certain lim-
162. Id. § 303(a)(1)(D).
163. See Id. § 303(c)(1). It is within the discretion of the President to determine
which other nations "have a significant import trade in the material." S. REP. No. 564,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982).
164. Implementation Act, supra note 64, § 303(c)(2)(A)-(B). It should be noted that a
nation need not be a party to the Convention to qualify as an importing state under the
Act. See, e.g., id. § 303(a)(1)(C)(i).
165. Id. § 303(d).
166. Id. § 303(e). In its procedural aspects, the Act requires the President to submit
information regarding a request for United States assistance to a "Cultural Property
Advisory Committee" which is to be composed of eleven persons representing the views
and interests of museums, experts in the fields of archaeology and related areas, experts
in the international sale of cultural property and persons representing the interest of the
general public. Id. § 303(0, 306(a)-(b). The President is instructed to consider recom-
mendations made by the Committee in its reports, id. § 303(f)(3), and then himself make
a report to Congress detailing action taken and describing any differences between such
action and the Committees' recommendations and the reasons therefor. Id. § 303(g). The
duties incumbent upon the Committee are set forth in § 306(f)-(g). Essentially these
involve an investigation as to the need for United States participation, the issuance of a
report setting forth preferable terms and conditions relating to any prospective agree-
ment and a list of cultural property that should be covered. Id. § 306(f)(1)-(2), (4). The
Committee is also bound to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of such agreements
and report its findings and recommendations to Congress and the President. Id. § 306(g).
167. Id. § 304(b). An "emergency condition" is defined by the Act thus:
(1) a newly discovered type of material which is of importance for the un-
derstanding of the history of mankind and is in jeopardy from pillage, disman-
tling, dispersal, or fragmentation;
1982]
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itations: (1) the State Party must have made a prior request for United
States assistance;'" (2) the President must consider the views of the
Committee-expressed in its report-before acting' "s and (3) the emer-
gency action can only continue for five years subject to three-year ex-
tensions if the emergency conditions persist.
17 0
The enforcement mechanism of the Act is embodied in §§ 307-308,
and 310. 1 1 Section 307 directs customs officers, "notwithstanding any
other provision of law," to refuse release of any "designated archaeo-
logical or ethnological material 1 7 2 which is unaccompanied by either a
certificate authorizing its export from the State Party of origin or "sat-
isfactory evidence"1 73 that the material was exported: (1) before desig-
nation of the matter as protected;1 7 4 or (2) at least ten years before
entry into the United States.1 7 5 Failure to produce such evidence or
documentation within ninety days subjects the material to seizure and
forfeiture under § 310.17 Section 308 implements article 7(b)(i) of the
UNESCO Convention 17 7 by imposing an absolute import ban on items
(2) identifiable as coming from any site recognized to be of high cultural
significance if such site is in jeopardy from pillage, dismantling, dispersal, or
fragmentation which is, or threatens to be, of crisis proportions; or
(3) a part of the remains of a particular culture or civilization, the record of
which is in jeopardy from pillage, dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation which
is, or threatens to be, of crisis proportions;
and application of the import restrictions set forth in section 307 on a tem-
porary basis would, in whole or in part, reduce the incentive for such pillage,
dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation.
Id. § 304(a).
168. Id. § 304(c)(1).
169. Id. § 304(c)(2). See supra text accompanying note 163.
170. Implementation Act § 304(c)(3). It should be further noted that subsequent to
any agreement made under § 303 or emergency action taken under § 304, the Secretary
of the Treasury must promulgate regulations listing the cultural property covered by the
above action. Id. § 305. This requirement is intended to ensure that the import restric-
tions of § 307 are only applied to such "designated" material and that "fair notice" is
provided to those persons who may seek to bring such items into the United States. Id. §
305. See also id. § 302(7) for a definition of "designated archaeological or ethnological
material."
171. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
172. See Implementation Act § 307.
173. See id. § 307(c) for a definition of "satisfactory evidence."
174. See supra text accompanying note 170.
175. Implementation Act, supra note 64, § 307(b)(2)(A)-(B). Aside from this ten year
requirement, neither the person on whose behalf the material is being imported, nor
anyone "related to" him or her can have "contracted for or acquired an interest, directly
or indirectly, in such material more than one year before that date of entry ... I" d. §
307(b)(2)(A). The term "related person" is defined in § 307(d).
176. Id. § 307(b).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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of "cultural property documented as appertaining to the inventory of a
museum or religious or secular public monument or similar institution
in any State Party." ' This definition of cultural property is designed
to cover cultural property listed in article 1 of the UNESCO Conven-
tion,1 7 9 but is not limited to "whether or not the [items are] specifically
designated by the State Party" as important; "[tihe term is thus
broader than, but inclusive of, 'archaeological or ethnological
material.' "18o
In general, "designated archaeological or ethnological material" or
"cultural property" introduced into the United States in violation of §
307 or § 308, respectively, is subject to seizure and forfeiture under the
existing customs laws."8 ' This section further details the procedure to
be followed for the return of such items to the claimant State Party,
and states when just compensation or reimbursement is necessary.18 2
Lastly, the Act specifies evidentiary requirements for forfeiture
proceedings brought concerning illegal importationsl8 and § 312 de-
limits a class of objects to which the provisions of the Act do not
apply.' "
In sum, the Implementation Act represents a huge step for the
United States in accepting responsibility for its role as a major art im-
porter. The Act's significance lies in its careful attempt to secure a
compromise between the complementary interests that have been
shown to underlie this area. 88 Whether or not the framework estab-
lished will accomplish this goal will ultimately rest on the extent to
which the President, given his broad discretionary powers under the
Act, sees this area as deserving of positive policy development.
III. Conclusion
The foregoing survey of the major legal responses to the illicit traf-
fic in cultural properties illustrates the United States emerging foreign
policy with respect to its role as a major art importer. It is important
to see that there exist valid interests and claims on both sides of the
question whether art should freely circulate from one nation to an-
178. Implementation Act, supra note 64, § 308.
179. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
180. S. RaP. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982).
181. Implementation Act, supra note 64, § 310(a).
182. Id. § 310(b)-(c). Section 309 states that a public museum or other cultural or
scientific institution can apply to retain cultural items pending a final determination by
customs officials of any violations of §§ 307-308. Id. § 309.
183. Id. § 311.
184. Id. § 312.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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other. Of utmost importance is the preservation of cultural property
and its protection from wanton pillage and destruction. What is called
for is a balance that preserves the art-rich nations' right to possess art
representing their cultural patrimonies within their borders and, at the
same time, recognizes the importance of allowing such art to be dis-
played and represented, to some degree, abroad. To this end, the legal
responses discussed are imperfect but positive steps; they demonstrate
that action must be taken in order to protect particular items from
certain destruction. Imperfect as they are, they detail the need for ad-
ditional study and action in this area.
Jeffrey L. Shanaberger
